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Zvi Lerman and David Sedik 
 
Introduction: The Significance of Agrarian Reform in Kyrgyzstan 
 
The dramatic changes that occurred in Kyrgyzstan‟s agriculture during the transition from 
plan to market are perhaps best illustrated by the shifting role of agricultural enterprises and 
individual farms. In 1988, toward the end of the Soviet era, just 500 agricultural enterprises 
(collective and state farms) controlled 98% of arable land. The quasi-private sector consisting 
of hundreds of thousands of small household plots controlled the remaining 2% of arable 
land. Twenty years later, in 2008, the share of agricultural enterprises (about 1,200 privatized 
successors of collective and state farms) in arable land had gone down to 25%, while the 
share of the individual sector (the traditional household plots and some 300,000 peasant farms 
that have emerged since 1992) had increased to 75%. 
 
The individualization of land holdings has been accompanied by an even sharper shift of 
livestock inventories from enterprises to family farms: the successors of collective and state 
farms have lost virtually all their animals, and livestock today is concentrated almost 
exclusively in household plots and peasant farms.  
 
The shift of productive resources – land and livestock – from enterprises to the individual 
sector has resulted in a significant increase in the share of individual farms in agricultural 
production. At the end of the Soviet era individual farms (the traditional household plots at 
that time) contributed 45% of Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) and agricultural enterprises 
produced the remaining 55%; in 2008, individual farms (household plots and peasant farms 
combined) contribute 98% of GAO and the share of enterprises had shrunk to just 2%. 
 
Individual farms achieve consistently higher levels of land productivity than agricultural 
enterprises. Among the two components of the individual sector, the traditional small 
household plots outperform the newly emergent peasant farms. Because of the higher 
productivity of family farms, the individualization of Kyrgyz agriculture has led to significant 
recovery of agricultural production. The steep decline in GAO that characterized the early 
years of transition (1990-1994) – a standard outcome of transition disruptions in all CIS 
countries – changed to robust growth after 1995, with GAO recovering to the 1990 Soviet-era 
peak already in 2002.  
 
The positive response in agricultural production occurred despite decrease in agricultural land 
use, shrinkage of machinery inventories, and sharp reduction in the use of fertilizers and other 
purchased inputs. Thus, renewed agricultural growth can be attributed primarily to changes in 
farming structure associated with the process of land reform.  Agricultural recovery was 
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driven entirely by growth in the individual sector of household plots and peasant farms, while 
the formerly dominant sector of agricultural enterprises continued its decline. 
 
Land reform in Kyrgyzstan has been highly successful by the measures of privatization and 
individualization. However, the progress with land ownership and land tenure reform has not 
been matched by reform or upgrading of farm support services and infrastructure for 
agriculture. The transition from the Soviet command system to a market-oriented economy 
has inevitably disrupted the old supply and marketing channels, while insufficient attention 
has been given to the creation and development of new channels. The situation is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet services were geared specifically to a few hundred 
large-scale agricultural enterprises, whereas land reform has produced over a million small- 
and medium-sized producers with fundamentally different needs. The recommendations in 
this study address the need for creating market services specifically geared to small farms, 
such as service cooperatives and extension services.  
 
Legislative Framework for Land and Farm Reform 
 
The process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan, as in all former Soviet countries, had to move 
agriculture from the Soviet model of state-owned land and predominance of large-scale farm 
enterprises to a market-oriented model of privately owned land with predominance of small- 
and medium-sized family farms. Land reform accordingly consisted of a two-pronged effort: 
(a) change in legal ownership of land from state property to private property (privatization); 
(b) shift in farming structure from corporate to individual farms (individualization). To the 
extent that large corporate farms continued to exist for various political and pragmatic 
reasons, their internal organization and management structure had to be radically changed 
from the old command-economy orientation to compliance with market-economy principles. 
 
Kyrgyzstan was the latest among the former Soviet republics to allow private land ownership.  
While Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova were the privatization trailblazers abolishing the 
monopoly of the state in agricultural land ownership at different stages between 1990 and 
1993, Kyrgyzstan recognized private land ownership as late as June 1998 following a 
referendum.
2 The referendum resulted in a constitutional change that explicitly allowed 
private ownership of land, in addition to municipal and state ownership: 
 
Land ... is the property of the Kyrgyz Republic, used as a foundation of life and 
activity for the Kyrgyz people and enjoying special protection by the state. 
(Article 4, para 2) 
Land may also be in private, municipal, and other forms of ownership ... as 
determined by law. (Article 4, para 3) 
 
Prior to 1998, all land was state owned, as in the former Soviet Union, but use rights were 
secure for 99 years and, after 1994, fully transferable. Having recognized private land 
ownership in 1998, Kyrgyzstan immediately imposed a 5-year moratorium on all transactions 
in privately owned land (1999 Land Code), thus moving backward by measures of land 
transferability compared with the pre-referendum period. Kyrgyzstan motivated the 
moratorium by the need to let the new landowners get used to the entire set of their property 
rights and fully recognize the implications of irrevocable decisions. The moratorium was 
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lifted in March 2001 (by the Law on Agricultural Land Management), largely in response to 
international donor pressure, but transferability of land continued to be constrained by a new 
administrative restriction: only persons who had lived in rural areas for a minimum of two 
years were eligible to own land.  
 
Table 1. Chronology of land legislation in Kyrgyzstan 
Reform 
phases 
Date  Name 
First phase  Feb 1991  Law on Peasant Farms (superseded by 1999 law) 
  Feb 1991  Law on Enterprises 
  Apr 1991  Law of Land Reform  
  Apr 1991  Measures for Implementation of Land Reform 
  Jun 1991  Land Code (superseded by 1999 code) 
  Dec 1992  Measures for Continuing Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reform 
  May 1993  New Constitution  
Second phase  Feb 1994  Measures on Deepening Land and Agrarian Reform  
  Mar 1994  Creation of the National Land Fund (later renamed Land Redistribution Fund) 
  Aug 1994  Procedures for Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reform 
  Aug 1994  Procedures for Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises 
  Aug 1994  Procedures for Land Share Determination and Issue of Land Use Certificates 
  Jun 1998  Referendum on Private Landownership (leading to a new constitution) 
  Oct 1998  Presidential Decree on Private Land Ownership  
  Dec 1998  Law on State Registration of Immovable Property Rights and Transactions in 
Them 
  May 1999  Law on Mortgage (Ch. 6: Special features of land mortgage) 
  Jun 1999  Land Code (superseded the 1991 code) 
  Jun 1999  Law on Peasant Farms (supersedes the original 1991 law) 
  Jan 2001  Law on Agricultural Land Management:lifting the moratorium on land sales (Mar 
2001) 
Third phase  Apr 2004  New Directions and Measures of Land and Agrarian Reform  
  Jun 2004  Law on Cooperatives 
  Jun 2007  Standard Procedure for Agricultural Land Leasing from the State Redistribution 
Reserve 
  Oct 2008  Tax Code (Section XIV, Chapters 48-51): Land Tax 
  Jan 2009  Law on Pastures 
 
Kyrgyzstan has gone through three stages of land reform since gaining independence (Table 
1): 
  First phase (1991-1993): the laws passed in this period set the basic principles and 
procedures for the reorganization of former collective enterprises through distribution 
of land and property shares to rural residents; the share mechanism facilitated the 
augmentation of household plots and the emergence of new family-style peasant farms 
operating outside the collectivist framework (contrary to the traditional household 
plots run by employees of collective farms and rural administrative organs);  
  Second phase (1994-2004): mass distribution of transferable land shares (with a target 
of covering 75% of all arable land) in conjunction with sweeping individualization of 
farming, especially after recognition of private ownership in 1998; creation of the 
Land Redistribution Fund with target holdings of 25% of all arable land remaining in 
state ownership for future contingencies; 
  Third phase (since 2004): officially designated “the concluding stage of land and 
agrarian reform”, with the following list of priorities (New Directions and Measures of 
Land and Agrarian Reform, Presidential Decree, April 2004): 
    -- wide range development of cooperatives; 
    -- development of peasant farms and agri-businesses; 
    -- focus on credit cooperatives, mortgage financing, and agricultural insurance;   4 
    -- determination of optimal plot sizes and registration; 
    -- rehabilitation and development of seed and livestock selection; 
    -- encouragement of agricultural sciences, consulting and marketing services; 
    -- creation of an effective system for technical, agrochemical, and veterinary 
      service; 
    -- development of marketing, processing, and export systems for agricultural 
      products; 
    -- improvement of water and pasture management; 
    -- social development of rural areas. 
 
While the first two phases were primarily concerned with the basics of land reform and farm 
restructuring – setting up land share allocation, converting land shares into physical plots, 
establishing mechanisms for creation and operation of peasant farms – the third phase in 
effect looks “beyond land reform”, by emphasizing attention to services and infrastructure. 
These are an essential component of any reform program and are intended to provide a 
supportive market environment for normal functioning of post-reform farms. 
 
Agricultural land is classified into two main components: arable land, which is the land 
cultivated to grow crops, and pastures, the uncultivated component used for grazing animals. 
Pastures make up 85% of agricultural land in Kyrgyzstan, with arable land accounting for the 
remaining 15%. Pastures were not subject to privatization and remained state property. 
Privatization efforts focused only on arable land. The land reform legislation set a 
privatization target of 75% of arable land, with the remaining 25% to be held in a State Land 
Redistribution Reserve for future contingencies. The privatization goal had been achieved by 
2003, when 940,000 hectares of arable land had been distributed in the form of land shares to 
nearly 2 million landowners – two-thirds of the rural population (Table 2). By February 2009 
the number of land-share owners had reached 2.7 million individuals or more than 80% of the 
rural population (Gosregister web site, 
http://www.gosreg.kg/gosreg_ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=129&Itemi
d=179 ).  
 
Table 2. Status of land privatization 2003-2008 
  2003  2008 
Total arable land  1239  1209 
Arable land in private ownership  937  940 
% of arable land in private ownership  76  78 
Number of private landowners  1,712,042  2,043,004 
Source: Gosregister, annual land balances for 1.1.2004 and 1.1.2009. 
 
The ultimate intent of the mechanism of land share distribution to the rural population was 
conversion of land shares into privately owned land plots for individual farming. This process 
triggered a rapid increase in the area of arable land under individual cultivation. Most but not 
all the land-share owners actually claimed their entitlement in physical form. The proportion 
of arable land in individual use (i.e., land claimed through conversion of land shares) grew 
steadily in the process of land reform, reaching 70% in 2003 and 73% in 2007 – slightly 
below the achieved privatization target of 75%. As the privatization process approached 
completion, the total arable land in individual use (by peasant farms and household plots 
combined) stabilized at around 920,000 hectares, with the remaining agricultural enterprises 
and other users controlling less than 400,000 hectares (Figure 1).  















Figure 1.  
 
The increase in land cultivated in the individual sector was accompanied by a rapid increase 
in the number of peasant farms, which rose from 20,000 to 250,000 during the period 
characterized as the second phase of land reform (1994-2001).
3 The increase in the number of 
peasant farms outstripped the growth of arable land, resulting in a sharp decline in average 
farm size – from 15 hectares in 1994-96 to 3 hectares since 2002 (Figure 2). The number of 
household plots is estimated at around 750,000 (first determined during the 2002 Agricultural 

















The changes in farm structure in the post-independence period are schematically 
demonstrated in Table 3, which compares the traditional Soviet farm structure with the 
structure that has emerged since the beginning of reforms in 1991. While the general 
classification into corporate and individual farms remains, the individual sector now consists 
of two distinct components: the traditional household plots carried over from the Soviet 
period and the new emergent peasant farms.  
 
                                                 
3There was a large one-time jump in the number of peasant farms in 2002, and the new (higher) number reflects 
the 2002 agricultural census findings. The abrupt increase in the number of peasant farms in 2002 was not 
accompanied by a commensurate change in arable land in peasant farms, which suggests that the increase in 
numbers was not due to technical reclassification from household plots to peasant farms in 2002.  
 
Kyrgyzstan: Arable land in individual farms 













Kyrgyzstan: Development of peasant farms




















ave size  6 
Table 3. Changes in farm structure: Soviet period and post-independence 
Soviet period  Since independence 
Corporate farms  Corporate farms 
Collective and state farms (kolkhozes, sovkhozes) 
Large-scale agricultural enterprises with thousands of 
hectares of land run by appointed managers subject to 
centrally set production plans 
Limited-liability partnerships, joint-stock companies, 
agricultural production cooperatives 
Successors of agricultural enterprises reorganized as 
share-based companies run by hired managers and 
greatly downsized (hundreds instead of thousands ha) 
Individual farms  Individual farms 
Household plots 
Small (less than 0.5 ha) family farms producing 
mainly for subsistence and selling their surplus output 
in the market; managed by rural residents (employees 
of corporate farms, employees of rural services, 
pensioners) 
Household plots 
Basically the same as in the Soviet period, with 
substantially enlarged land holdings, but still very 
small; mix of subsistence and commercial farming 
with predominance of livestock 
Peasant farms 
Mid-sized family farms (1-10 ha) created outside the 
corporate framework under new (post-1992) 
legislation on land allocated from state reserves to 
qualified applicants; mainly commercial farming with 
predominance of crop production 
 
 
Outcomes of Reform: Agricultural Production and Resources 
 
Land and farm reforms in all transition countries are intended to cure the chronic 
inefficiencies of the Soviet legacy. The inefficiency of inherited agriculture can be traced to a 
system of distorted incentives inherent in the Soviet system‟s reliance on corporate farms in 
preference to family farms that dominate agriculture in market economies. Individual 
accountability characterizing family farms and missing in corporate farms is expected to cure 
the many weaknesses and failings of agriculture based on large-scale corporate farms. 
Consistently with these theoretical considerations, land and farm reform legislation in all CIS 
countries, including Kyrgyzstan, emphasizes transition to individual land tenure and a shift 
from large-scale corporate farms to more manageable small- and mid-sized family farms. In 
the sections that follow we show that in Kyrgyzstan these changes have indeed led to 
agricultural recovery through resumption of growth and improvement of farm productivity. 
 
The main outcome of reforms is best illustrated by the recent changes in the long-term pattern 
of agricultural development in Kyrgyzstan (Figure 3). During the last three decades 
Kyrgyzstan‟s agricultural development has gone through three successive phases, which are 
discernible for all CIS countries. The first phase can be characterized as the Soviet growth 
period, and it extended until 1990. The GAO index in 1990 was 150% of the GAO level in 
1980, and it is notable that Kyrgyzstan did not suffer from the stagnation that was typical of 
the Gorbachev era (1985-1990) in other CIS countries. The second phase is the transition 
collapse triggered by the dismantling of the traditional Soviet system and the disruption of all 
support services in agriculture. The GAO index dropped by 40% between 1990 and 1995, 
bottoming out in 1995 at 80% of the 1980 level. The third phase is the recovery phase 
characterized by renewed agricultural growth after 1995, when the changes associated with 





















The remarkable growth since 1995 was definitely not caused by an increase in agriculture‟s 
resource base. Arable land contracted from a peak of 1.4 million hectares in 1994 to 1.3 
million hectares in 2007, while more than 5 million hectares of pasture land shifted out of 
productive use by farms and villages. The potentially negative effect of the decrease in 
agricultural land resources was reinforced by the shrinkage of machinery inventories and 
sharp reduction in the use of fertilizers and other purchased inputs compared with the Soviet 
levels in 1988 (Table 4). Still, agricultural production has shown robust increase, rising by 
75% since 1995 and overtaking the Soviet record. In the absence of significant increases in 
resources, this is apparently associated with the dramatic changes in incentives that 
accompanied the shift from former collective agriculture to individual and family farming in 
the process of land and farm reform.
4 
 
Table 4. Farm machinery inventories and fertilizer application 1988-2007 (all farms) 
  1988  2007  2007 in percent of 1988 
Farm machinery (physical units)       
Tractors  32,653  24,531  75 
Grain combines  4,229  3,091  73 
Feed combines  2,155  326  15 
Fertilizer application       
Total (all farms), „000 tons  296.4  28.7  10 
Per hectare sown, kg*  181  25.5  14 
*Agricultural enterprises in 1988, all farms in 2007. 
Source: 1988 from Narkhoz KyrSSR 1988; 2007 from 2007 AgYB 
  
Individualization of agriculture 
 
The most remarkable change in Kyrgyz agriculture since 1991 is the dramatic 
individualization of land tenure and farm production triggered by the process of land and farm 
reform even before the privatization referendum of 1998. As a result of these processes, the 
share of agricultural enterprises in arable land went down from 98% in 1988 to 25% in 2008, 
while the share of the individual sector increased from just 2% to 75% (see Figure 1). In 
1988, toward the end of the Soviet era, just 500 agricultural enterprises (collective and state 
farms) controlled over 1.3 million hectares or 98% of arable land. The quasi-private sector 
                                                 
4 Agricultural labor is the only factor of production that showed a steady increase over time, growing faster than 
the total population. It is hard to argue that this factor alone could lead to growth in agricultural production by 
offsetting the negative effects of the decline in land, machinery, and purchased inputs. 
Kyrgyzstan: GAO 1980-2007 (all farms)
CIS13 (1983 prices)+Natkomstat+Ag YBs: physical volume
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consisting of hundreds of thousands of small household plots controlled the remaining 2% of 
arable land – less than 60,000 hectares. Twenty years later, in 2008, the holdings of the now 
privatized successors of collective and state farms (about 1,200 in number) are down to 
350,000 hectares of arable land while individual farms (the traditional household plots and 

















The individualization of land holdings has been accompanied by an even sharper shift of 
livestock inventories from enterprises to family farms (Figure 4): the successors of collective 
and state farms have lost virtually all their animals, and livestock today is concentrated almost 
exclusively in household plots and peasant farms.  
 
The shift of productive resources – land and livestock – from enterprises to the individual 
sector has resulted in a significant increase in the share of individual farms in agricultural 
production (as measured by the aggregate value of Gross Agricultural Output – GAO). At the 
end of the Soviet era individual farms (the traditional household plots at that time) contributed 
45% of Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) and agricultural enterprises produced the remaining 
55%; in 2008, individual farms (household plots and peasant farms combined) contribute 98% 

















Kyrgyzstan: Livestock inventories by farm type










Kyrgyzstan: GAO by farm type 1991-2007
Natkomstat
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Productivity of different farm types 
 
The individual sector – household plots and peasant farms combined – contributes 98% of 
GAO (the value of agricultural output) on just 75% of arable land. This disparity between the 
share of individual farms in output and land is a persistent phenomenon that was observed 
also in the Soviet period, when household plots – the only type of family farm in existence at 
that time – produced 45% of GAO on just 2% of land. The disparity between shares of 
production and land provides a measure of relative productivity: the entire agricultural sector  
produces 100% of GAO on 100% of land with relative productivity of 1; relative 
productivities higher 1 (when the share of output is greater than the share of land) are 
indicative of land being used more efficiently than the average for the entire sector, while 
relative productivities less than 1 (when the share of output is less than the share of land) 














Figure 6.  
 
Estimates of relative efficiency of land utilization for farms of the three main types – 
agricultural enterprises, peasant farms, and household plots – presents a clear ranking (Figure 
6), with the efficiency of land utilization rising sharply from enterprises (the lowest) to 
household plots (the highest). The low relative productivity of agricultural enterprises 
suggests that they are very inefficient in the utilization of the large land resources that they 
continue to control: more efficient farming could generate substantially greater output from 




















Kyrgyzstan: Crop productivity by farm type 1999-2007
Ag YBs: current prices









Kyrgyzstan: Relative crop productivity by farm type 1999-2007








% crop GAO/% sown area
1999-2007  10 
Alongside relative productivities of land utilization, we can also calculate the absolute land 
productivity for different farm types as the value of crop production (which is available in 
current prices since 1999) per hectare of sown land. Individual farms are observed to achieve 
consistently higher levels of land productivity than agricultural enterprises (Figure 7). Among 
the two components of the individual sector, the traditional small household plots outperform 
the newly emergent peasant farms.  
 
Because of the higher productivity of family farms, the individualization of Kyrgyz 
agriculture has led to significant recovery of agricultural production. The steep decline in 
GAO that characterized the early years of transition (1990-1994) changed to robust growth 
after 1995, when the second phase of land reform began. Following the shift to more 
productive individual agriculture GAO recovered to the 1990 Soviet-era peak already in 2002 
















Agricultural recovery was driven entirely by growth in the individual sector of household 
plots and peasant farms, while the formerly dominant sector of agricultural enterprises 
















Farm sizes and land concentration 
 
Land reform distributed land in one form or another to roughly 1.2 million farmers: about 
900,000 household plots and 300,000 peasant farms. The 2002 Agricultural Census provides 
information that enables us to compute the average size of farms of the three main types – 
Kyrgyzstan: GAO by farm type 1990-2006











Ag YBs: physical volume
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enterprises, peasant farms, and household plots (Table 5). The average enterprise in 2002 had 
220 hectares of arable land – a far cry from the average size of 2,500-3,000 hectares at the end 
of the Soviet period (1988-1990). Still, even the shrunken enterprises were two orders of 
magnitude larger than peasant farms (3.80 hectares on average), which in turn were an order 
of magnitude larger than household plots (0.10 hectares). 
 
It is noteworthy that peasant farms and even household plots augment their private holdings 
with leased land: peasant farms have nearly 20% of leased land in their total holdings, while 
household plots lease 11% of the land they farm. At least some of this land comes from 
enterprises (mainly state farms), which lease out much of the land under their control. Thus, 
685 state farms control in total about 350,000 hectares of arable land, but they actually use 
only 130,000 hectares, leasing out 220,000 hectares to other users (peasant farms and 
household plots).  
 
Table 5. Number of farms and average farm size in the 2002 Agricultural Census 
Farm type  Number of farms  Ave size, ha  Percent of owned 
land in used land 
State farms  685  192  260 
Collective farms  722  246  83 
All enterprises  1,407  220  158 
Peasant farms  243,294  3.80  81 
Household plots  753,334  0.10  89 
 
The overall outcome of the land distribution process can be summarized by a standard Lorenz 
land-concentration curve, which plots the cumulative percentage of (arable) land versus the 
cumulative percentage of farms (Figure 10, also from the 2002 Agricultural Census). For 
Kyrgyzstan (thick black curve) 90% of (smallest) farms control just 20% of arable land and 
the remaining 10% of (larger) farms control 80% of arable land. This Lorenz curve is 
characterized by very high inequality, as measured by the area of the bulge between the 
diagonal (the ideal uniform distribution) and the actual curve. Kyrgyzstan after all its reform 
efforts still has very high concentration of land in relatively large farms and a very large 
number of small farms with very little land. This type of land concentration is similar to what 
prevailed during the Soviet era and what is still observed in low-reform countries such as 
Russia or Ukraine. The land-concentration curve for Azerbaijan (thick gray curve), on the 
other hand, shows much more equality than the Kyrgyzstan curve and is clearly closer to the 
















Kyrgyzstan: Concentration of arable land 2002 census












Azer  12 
 
Combining the results of this section – low productivity of large corporate farms and high 
concentration of land in large farms – we conclude that the land reform process in Kyrgyzstan 
is only partially complete. Further efforts are needed to reallocate the land locked in non-
productive large farms to more productive individual farms. This process will create a larger 
number of mid-sized family farms and transform the Kyrgyzstan land-concentration curve to 




There are considerable differences in the product mix (shares of crop and livestock 
production) between household plots and farms of other types (Figure 11). Household plots 
lean toward livestock specialization, with more than 60% of their output originating from 
livestock production (averages for 1998-2007; no data on output by farm type are available 
prior to 1998). At the other extreme, agricultural enterprises specialize in crops, with less than 
20% of their output in livestock products. The peasant farms that began to emerge after 1992 
occupy an intermediate position, 
with a strong leaning toward crop 
production: their product mix is 
65% crops and 35% livestock – 
more livestock than in agricultural 
enterprises but substantially less 
than in household plots. The 
livestock bias of production in 
household plots is consistent with 







Nationally, the product mix since 1999 has fluctuated around 55% crops and 45% livestock. 
This contrasts with 45% crops and 55% livestock that persisted all through the 1980s and the 
early 1990s (Figure 12). The switch between the two product mix regimes occurred between 


















Kyrgyzstan: Crop/livestock shares 1991-2007












Kyrgyzstan: Product mix by farm type
Averages for 1998-2007
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Changing cropping pattern 
 
The steady increase of livestock inventories during the Soviet era (1960-1990) was supported 
by the increase of areas sown to forage crops, which came at the expense of areas allocated to 
cereals and to a certain extent also cotton. During the post-Soviet transition period, on the 
other hand, we witness dramatic reduction of areas under forage crops, which allowed re-
expansion of cereals (from considerations of food self-sufficiency) and cotton (from 
apparently misguided considerations of export potential). In addition to increasing cereal and 
cotton areas, Kyrgyzstan increased the share of land under high-value crops, such as 

















The increased share of high-value crops in sown area is a reflection of the strategy followed 
by the small household plots, which are better adapted to growing vegetables rather than the 
traditional cash crops and rely on these readily marketable crops as an important supplement 
of family income. 
Kyrgyzstan: Cropping pattern (all farms)
Narkhoz+Ag YBs
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The Unfinished Reform Agenda 
 
By all standard measures land reform has been highly successful in Kyrgyzstan. Fully 78% of 
arable land has been transferred to private ownership since the introduction of private land 
ownership a decade ago (Gosregister, 1 January 2009), 75% of arable land and nearly 100% 
of livestock are now in individual use, and the individual sector currently contributes 98% of 
gross agricultural output. The shift to individual farming has been unquestionably one of the 
main factors responsible for the resumption of agricultural growth after 1995.  
 
Yet Ministry of Agriculture officials remain dissatisfied and highly skeptical of these 
achievements. They view land reform as a destructive process that dismantled the capital-
intensive and highly commercialized large-scale farms and drove Kyrgyzstan to highly 
fragmented small subsistence farms. In promoting this view, they ignore the well-documented 
chronic inefficiency of the Soviet model of agriculture and the recent evidence of superior 
performance of family farms in all CIS countries, including Kyrgyzstan.  
 
These official views are responsible for the following dismal picture of Kyrgyz agriculture 
today: 
 
  Most village families practice subsistence agriculture and are allocated small parcels of land to 
produce food for their families. These plots are often barely sufficient to feed each family, and the 
purchase of seed and fertilizer is often too expensive. Even if a surplus can be produced, it is 
difficult to transport it to markets. The lack of machinery means that the labor is mainly carried out 
by family members. Most villages lack basic facilities to process wool, preserve fruit, and add 
value to their crops.  
  Kyrgyzstan Community Business Forum (Web Site), Subsistence Agriculture,  
  http://www.kyrgyzstan-cbf.org/Community/Subsistence_Agriculture/subsistence_agriculture.html. 
 
It is of course true that family farms created in the process of land reform are small, with 
average holdings of just 0.8 hectares of arable land per farm (2002 Ag Census; 3.1 ha per 
peasant farm, 0.1 ha per household plot). However, even these small farms are not pure 
subsistence operations, as suggested by the above paragraph: sales of farm products from the 
household plot consistently account for 20% of family cash income (between 2001 and 2007; 
Uroven’ zhizni naseleniya 2001-2005, 2003-2007, Bishkek). Kyrgyz farmers suffer from what 
is generally known as “the curse of smallness”, and institutions are needed to help them 
achieve the benefits of larger size – not so much in production as in product marketing and in 
access to inputs or machinery.  
 
The unfinished agenda of land and farm reform broadly consists of two sets of issues: 
1) Further land allocation efforts, including distribution of land from the State Redistribution 
Fund, attention to small farm consolidation options, and novel pasture management 
techniques designed to counteract continued abandonment of pastures. 
2) Development and improvement of farm services and farm infrastructure, designed 
specifically for small family farms and intended to counteract the “curse of smallness”. 
 
In what follows we describe some priority areas for further action by international donors that 
can provide assistance with respect to the unfinished reform agenda. Ongoing and recently 
completed projects of international donors in farm-related areas are listed in Annex Table 
A.1.   15 
Priority areas for action: development of cooperatives, access to farm credit, extension 
and training 
 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for the rural population in Kyrgyzstan, which is 
relatively poor compared with urban population. The issue of raising rural incomes and 
improving the rural standard of living is therefore a major concern for policy makers in 
Kyrgyzstan. Rural development theory generally identifies four approaches to improving rural 
incomes: 
a)  Increases in productivity (i.e., yields per unit of land or yields per head of livestock) – 
intensive approach; 
b)  Increases in endowments (land, livestock, machinery, fertilizers, other purchased 
inputs) – extensive approach; 
c)  Increases in commercialization through improvement of access to market channels and 
shift to higher value-added products; 
d)  Improved knowledge transfer and extension; 
e)  Diversification into non-agricultural employment in rural areas. 
 
The last item – diversification into non-agricultural employment in rural areas – falls outside 
the scope of the present proposal and should be dealt with separately in view of its extreme 
importance for rural incomes. Two other items relating to increases in both productivity and 
endowments are the focus of various technical projects implemented by major international 
donors, including the World Bank and USAID. A more appropriate niche for FAO is probably 
to focus on technical assistance for increasing commercialization levels among individual 
farmers and also improving extension and training systems, which in turn have a direct impact 
on productivity and rural incomes.  
 
Land  is  one  component  of  the  operating  environment  that  encourages  commercialization: 
empirical evidence shows that larger farms tend to be more commercial. However, given land, 
farmers should be able to produce, which requires channels for the delivery of knowledge, 
inputs, and machinery to the farms. Once the harvest is in, farmers should be able to sell it, 
which requires access to marketing channels.  
 
In the past, the traditional individual sector – the household plots – was generously supported 
by the local collective or cooperative enterprise, which actually provided all the upstream and 
downstream services. In this way, the large farm enterprise substituted for the missing market 
channels and enabled the household plots to maintain their partial commercialization. Today, 
the individual sector largely has to fend for itself in the new market environment, however 
imperfect. World Bank surveys in CIS provide consistent evidence that the individual sector – 
both household plots and peasant farms – is shifting its business from farm enterprises and 
state-affiliated channels to private traders, wholesalers, and retail markets. This observation is 
equally valid for both product sales and farm supply purchases.  
 
Individual  farmers  experience  many  difficulties  in  their  attempts  to  sell  farm  products. 
Farmers universally complain of low prices received; they often complain that it is difficult to 
find  a  buyer  for  their  products;  they  experience  serious  problems  with  transporting  their 
products to the market; individual farmers recognize that their output is too small to sell. With 
regard to farm inputs, the universal complaint is that the prices are too high, although physical 
availability as such (i.e., finding a supplier) is not a problem. 
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All  these  are  typical  problems  of  smallness.  They  are  not  unique  to  transition  countries: 
family farmers all over the world experience similar problems, although admittedly they are 
less acute in a  functioning market  environment.  In addition  to  difficulties with  sales and 
inputs  due  to  lack  of  bargaining  power  (prices)  or  restricted  physical  access  to  markets 
(finding  a  buyer,  transport),  the  problems  of  smallness  are  also  reflected  in  shortage  of 
machinery (too expensive to buy for a small farmer) and restricted access to credit (lack of 
collateral, high transaction costs for small loans).  
 
Service Cooperatives, Machinery Pools, and Farm Credit Cooperatives 
 
The standard solution for the problems of smallness in market economies is to establish a 
farmers‟  service  cooperative.  Both  theory  and  world  experience  suggest  that  service 
cooperatives are established to correct for market failure, i.e., when private entrepreneurs are 
reluctant to enter into a particular area for various reasons (spatial dispersion, remoteness, 
narrow product requirements) and as a result farmers are faced with missing services (Cobia, 
1989). Service cooperatives cure the problems of smallness by endowing small individual 
farmers with the benefits of collective operational size; they assure access to supplies and 
markets for their members; and achieve market power through size. Cooperative machinery 
pools relieve the individual farmer from the pressure of purchasing own equipment. Service 
cooperatives  also  achieve  overall  risk  reduction  through  portfolio  diversification  effects 
(Zusman, 1988). This improves their credit standing vis-à-vis the banks, enabling them to 
negotiate access to loans and lower interest rates for their members. 
 
These advantages of joint action through cooperation in services (as opposed to cooperation 
in production) are borne out by long-term experience all over the world. In market economies, 
cooperatives of course are not the only institution that small farmers use. Many functions and 
services are handled competitively by private entrepreneurs, obviating the need for service 
cooperatives. In transition economies, where the market environment is still underdeveloped 
and  not  fully  functional,  the  benefits  of  cooperation  appear  to  be  self-evident.  There  is, 
however, a strong psychological resistance to cooperation bred from years of abuse of the 
whole concept by socialist regimes. As aptly noted by Plunkett Foundation (1995),  
The use of the word “co-operative” in Central and Eastern Europe will not 
only create the wrong impression, it will also create barriers to progress. The 
old style of co-operative or collective has no relevance in the new free-market 
approach. 
 
Despite this resistance, we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of cooperation among 
individual farmers in transition countries. This is voluntary cooperation, often informal and 
sporadic, that stands in a stark contrast to the all-pervasive mandatory cooperation of the 
socialist  era.  Cooperation  in  machinery  is  one  of  the  major  areas  of  cooperation  among 
individual  farmers  in  transition  countries.  Through  cooperation,  the  actual  access  of 
individual farmers to machinery and machinery services is much higher than that suggested 
by machinery ownership rates. Thus, in Armenia only 14% of farmers own farm machinery 
(either individually or jointly with their relatives and neighbors). Machinery pools and service 
cooperatives, however, ensure that fully 80% of individual farmers in this country have access 
to machinery or mechanical field services (Lerman and Mirzakhanian, 2001). In Moldova, 
less than 30% of peasant farmers participating in the 2000 World Bank survey have their own 
machinery; another 40% have access to machinery through joint ownership (a kind of low-
level  cooperation)  or  rental;  finally  over  30%  buy  mechanical  field  services.  Both 
cooperatives and private rental companies provide an adequate solution to the problems of   17 
smallness  and  fixity,  which  prevent  widespread  ownership  of  farm  machinery  by  small 
individual  farmers.  If  private  entrepreneurs  provide  competitive  machinery  rentals  and 
services, all the better. If no such services are available from private companies, cooperatives 
can be established to fill the gap. 
 
Kyrgyzstan seems to have overcome the generally suspicious attitude toward the concept of 
cooperative that prevails in CIS. There appears to be considerable interest in cooperatives and 
cooperation at all levels of administration and society. Cooperatives are indeed viewed as a 
possible cure to the problems of smallness created by land privatization. However, there is a 
great deal of general confusion about what type of cooperatives are desirable (service 
cooperatives in the broad sense of the word) and what type of cooperatives should not be 
promoted (production cooperatives) in the light of experience in market economies. Technical 
assistance from international donors can contribute on several levels: 
  Providing general policy guidance and policy advice regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of cooperatives, especially aiming to steer the Kyrgyz decision makers 
from the idea of re-establishing large collective farms in the guise of production 
cooperatives 
  Providing instruction materials and specific technical advice on organization and 
functioning of cooperatives 
  Providing advice on the re-drafting of the law of cooperatives; this advice should rely 
on a combination of economic and legal considerations and be provided by experts 
from both fields.  
 
Access to Credit 
 
The  conventional  wisdom  is  that  individual  farmers  in  transition  countries  suffer  from  a 
severe shortage of credit – both short-term working capital credit and long-term investment 
credit. This, of course, is presented as an obstacle to normal and efficient farm operation. 
However, small farmers worldwide are highly conservative and risk-averse individuals who 
are reluctant to borrow. Experience in market economies shows that farmers do not rush to the 
banks  to  finance  every  investment  instantly  with  debt.  Farmers  wait  until  they  have 
accumulated  enough  savings  to  buy  or  build,  as  needed.  When  credit  is  easily  available 
through (generally subsidized) government sources, farmers, like everybody else, fall into the 
moral hazard trap of soft-budget constraints: they over-borrow, over-invest, and end up in 
serious trouble. To facilitate investment, we need to encourage farmers to be profitable and 
save “out of cash”. Sophistical rural credit facilities for investment are probably less relevant. 
 
In market economies, short-term loans for working capital are often handled through channels 
that do not involve bank borrowing. First, there is natural supplier credit that all farms use. 
Second, short-term financing can be raised through a variety of product–credit interlinkage 
arrangements: the farm pledges its future harvest against a bridging loan for working capital. 
Interlinkage arrangements are universally practiced by service cooperatives, which supply 
inputs and extend credit to their members in return for the promise of future delivery of 
members‟ harvest.  
 
A  more  sophisticated  non-cooperative  interlinkage  scheme  involves  contract  production, 
whereby  a  farmer  undertakes  to  produce  and  deliver  a  certain  crop  to  a  marketer  or  a 
processor in return for a working-capital loan or inputs supplied in kind. Service cooperatives 
often assume the responsibility for financing under contract production arrangements. Outside 
the cooperative framework, the buyer–financier may be a large foreign corporation with a   18 
special interest in gaining a market share for its products (farm inputs) or securing a source of 
farm  commodities  for  its  marketing  or  processing  operations  (grain,  grapes,  vegetables). 
Warehouse receipts, whereby financing is made available against stored commodities pending 
their sale, is in a sense a variety of contract sales. 
 
A popular solution for rural credit problems advocated by international donors involves the 
establishment of credit unions. These are small specialized credit cooperatives that rely on 
mutual guarantee and strong peer pressure for successful operation. Their operation is not 
interlinked with input supply or product marketing: their charter is to lend money to their 
members  for  business  needs  (including  farming).  There  are  large  numbers  of  such  credit 
unions in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltics. Efforts are underway to extend the 
network to Ukraine and Russia. The problem is that, by their very nature, they are designed to 
make very small loans: somewhere between $50 and $100. This is nowhere near what farmers 
perceive as their credit needs. Credit unions may be an excellent solution for the development 
of small cottage industries or, indeed, for the support of subsistence farming. They are too 
small for the purpose of moving from subsistence to commercialization, where interlinkage 
and contracting are more appropriate mechanisms. 
 
Extension and Education 
 
Education and human capital in general are extremely important for successful operation of 
the farm, especially in the context of the thesis that individual farms should be encouraged to 
grow in the interest of commercialization. After all, farms in market economies grow until the 
owner reaches the limit of his or her managerial capacity, which is clearly determined by a 
combination of personal intelligence, experience, and education.   
Farmers  participating  in  various  surveys  express  a  clear  need  for  instruction  and 
advice  related  to  preparation  of  business  plans  and  farm  management  practices.  There  is 
clearly nothing in their background that prepares them for these specific farm-management 
tasks that are essential in a market-oriented environment. Yet farmers also express a very 
strong  need  for  technical  extension  services  related  to  straightforward  crop  and  livestock 
production. They seek advice concerning seed selection, fertilizer and pesticide application, 
crop rotation, and animal health.  
In the past, household plots received all their technical advice and extension services 
from the large team of agro-specialists in the local farm enterprise. This mechanism does not 
function  any  more,  and  field  visits  in  transition  countries  indicate  that  the  delivery  of 
extension  to  the  farm  level  has  indeed  suffered  considerably.  Partial  solutions  include 
establishment  of  private  advisory  services  by  former  collective-farm  specialists.  A  more 
comprehensive  solution  to  instruction,  technical  advice,  and  extension  services  could  be 
found in local cooperative frameworks. After all, member education is one of the traditional 
subsidiary tasks of farmer cooperatives in all market economies. Yet we cannot ignore the 
fact that education and information are public goods, and governments certainly should play 
an  active  role  in  rehabilitation  and  reanimation  of  the  agricultural  extension  systems  in 
transition countries. 
A particular area that requires extension reinforcement is livestock management on 
small farms. Virtually the entire livestock herd is concentrated in rural households, each with 
two-three  cows.  Although  the  milk  yields  in  Kyrgyzstan  are  the  highest  among  the  five 
Central Asian nations, they are low by world standards at around 2,000 liters per cow per 
year. Yields can be improved by attention to animal genetics, animal health, and feed supply, 
issues  that  can  be  effectively  addressed  by  technical  assistance  and  guidance  geared 
specifically to small farmers with very small herds.   19 
As  with  credit,  the  need  for  extension  and  education  has  to  be  put  in  a  proper 
perspective. The small farmers in transition countries are not illiterate peasants. These are 
educated people who spent all their lives working on a large farm. Even if their formal job 
was  a  tractor  driver  or  a  milking-machine  operator,  they  had  gained  valuable  all-sided 
experience from many years of work on the household plot. They essentially know how to 
farm even under the new conditions, without the strong traditional backing of the old farm 
enterprise. Extension can help to improve their performance and raise their profitability. In 
this way, extension should be conducive to greater commercialization. Yet the small farmers 
in transition countries will continue to operate and develop even if extension systems are not 
fully in place for some time to come. 
 
Development of working procedures and legislation on land allocation and land tenure 
 
The hugely important work on land allocation and land tenure undertaken by the USAID 
Land Reform Project remains unfinished with the premature termination of the project in mid-
2009. Attention to the following outstanding issues can advance allocation of undistributed 
arable land to rural residents and, as a consequence, promote augmentation and consolidation 
of the very small farms that characterize Kyrgyzstan‟s agriculture today.  
  Strategies and procedures for reclamation of degraded land (both state and privately 
owned) are urgently needed: while there is no precise information on the total area of 
degraded land, there is a general feeling that this constitutes an acute problem 
requiring attention. 
  State-owned arable land (about 15% of all arable land in Kyrgyzstan) requires 
development of allocation procedures (through leasing auctions and other 
mechanisms) geared to differential land quality (such as prime quality land, land 
requiring investment for improvement, degraded land requiring reclamation by 
investors). 
  Another 15% of arable land is classified as “land of uncertain ownership”. This is 
neither private land nor state-owned land, and it is currently managed by 
municipalities contrary to the provisions of the Land Code. These “uncertain 
ownership” lands should be surveyed and mapped in each village and their ownership 
and tenure status should be formalized in accordance with the law. 
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Annex Table A.1. Selected international donor projects in Kyrgyzstan 
The projects in the table are categorized by main areas of activity (in the first column under “category”), but the “terms of reference” in fact cut across several categories, as 
can be easily seen from the last column that lists the objectives. More details on these and other projects can be found in the document Agricultural Sector and Related 
Projects, prepared by the Policy Support Project and Directorate for Agrarian Policy and Investments, Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources, and Processing Industry 
(MAWRPI) of the Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek, December 2008). 
Category  Project  Donor  Period  Cost (mlns)  Objectives 
Rural 
development 
Agricultural Area Development Project in Chui 
Oblast 
ADR  2000-2006  $45.0  (a) farmer training, (b) land rehabilitation, (c) 
irrigation, (d) farm services and marketing 
  Southern Agriculture Area Development Project   ADR  2007-2013  $29.3  same as above 
  UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme   UNDP  2005-2010  $4.55  assistance in meeting MDG 
  Kyrgyz Agro-input Enterprise Development 
Project II:  
USAID  2001-2010  $5.6  increase rural incomes through improved crop and 
livestock productivity 
  Support to Food Security, Regional Cooperation 
and Stability in Batken Region 
GTZ  2002-2007  Euro 4.3  poverty alleviation and improvement of living 
standards through improved production, services, 
and training 
Land reform  Agriculture Support Services Project  World Bank  1998-2007  $27.3  Land and agrarian reform; rural advisory services; 
environmental protection 
  Land Reform and Land Market Development in 
Kyrgyzstan 
USAID  2005-2009  n.a.  legislation support, agricultural land mortgage, 
management of state-owned agricultural land 




2006-2016  $1.4 billion  multi-country, multi-donor initiative to enhance the 




Local Market Development  Swiss 
Government 
2006-2012  Euro 0.6/year  value chain approach: “operators, supporters, 
influencers” 
  Agribusiness and Marketing Project:   World Bank  2005-2010  $14.9  market development for agricultural commodities; 
export promotion; access to credit for enterprises in 
agriculture and food sector 
  Farmer to Farmer:   USAID  1993-2008  n.a. (grant)  agro-processing, marketing, water management, 
cooperatives, education 
Cooperatives  Cooperatives Development Fund Raiffaisen   GTZ  2003-2008  n.a.  Development of legal framework and operating 
methodology for service cooperatives 
  Development of Trade and Service Cooperatives   GTZ  2003-2008  n.a.  Assistance to groups interested in forming service 
and trade cooperatives   21 
 
Category  Project  Donor  Period  Cost (mlns)  Objectives 
Extension 
and training 




2001-2008  $0.5/year  “new form of training for farmers” 







Establishment of Rural Advisory Services centers 
and an Advisory Training Center 
  Osh Agricultural Training and Extension   TES Centre   since 
02/99 
n.a.  design training and consultation programs for 
farmers to increase farming incomes 
  Policy Support Project  Swiss 
Government 
2002-2009  $30,000/year  MAWPRI capacity building, extension policy 
Water 
management 
Water Users Association Support Program  USAID  2004-2010  $1.39  strengthening organizational capacity, financial 
sustainability, infrastructure rehabilitation, water 
conservation 
  On-Farm Irrigation Project  World Bank  2001-2013  $50  establishment and strengthening of water-users 
associations, infrastructure rehabilitation  
  Water Management Improvement Project  World Bank  2006-2011  $28.2  improved irrigation service delivery, improved 
national water resource management 
Livestock 
and pastures 
Agricultural Investments and Services Project  World Bank  2008-2013  $25.5  pasture management and improvement; advisory 
services to farmers; food security 
  Sustainable Mountain Pastures Management in 
the Suusamyr Valley 
UNDP  2007-2012  $1.95  reduce negative effects of grazing through cost-
effective pasture management mechanisms 








2003-2010  $2.88  promote organic farming in Central Asia through 
capacity building, production support, and trade 
promotion 
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